The Threefold objeCT of The sCIenTIfIC knowledge.
Pseudo-sCoTus and The lITeraTure on The meteorologiCa In fourTeenTh-CenTury ParIs
This paper studies the questions on Aristotle's Meteorologica published in the Wadding edition of Duns Scotus, attributed to Duns Scotus until the twentieth century and to Simon Tunsted since then. It provides a critical note on the literature and points out a contamination in the text: the fourth book of Pseudo-Scotus is an incomplete copy of Themon Judaeus. It then provides a doctrinal commentary of the question "Utrum de meteorologicis sit scientia" in the context of fourteenth-century epistemological discussions over the object of science. I show that the thesis advanced by Pseudo-Scotus, together with other Parisian masters, on the object of science, is forged in response to the general rejection of Gregory of Rimini's theory of the total significate of the proposition.
* Parisian natural philosophy in the fourteenth century has been the object of increased interest in medieval studies for over a century now, but not much scholarly attention has been paid yet to the distinct and sophisticated literature on Aristotle's Meteorologica produced in this intellectual setting. One can find a similar set of meteorological questions developed by major figures of this period, such as John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, Albert of Saxony, and Themon Judaeus. With the exception of the latter, whose work was published in the sixteenth century, most of this material is still to be edited. 1 It is notoriously hard to trace filiations between these * Research for this article was financed by the Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Vlaanderen (FWO) and by the Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique -Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles (FNRS). I thank Sorana Corneanu and Charles T. Wolfe for having corrected my English. figures, who were members of what has been characterized as a close intellectual network. 2 Our grasp of the Meteorologica literature is made particularly difficult by the heavy contaminations encountered in the manuscript tradition, which raises many questions of intellectual paternity, even down to the level of particular questions. Aleksander Birkenmajer was the only scholar who had extensive knowledge of this literature, but unfortunately he never completed his projected book on the subject. His work from the beginning of the last century offers nevertheless the basis for our current knowledge.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical overview of this literature and some new material elements regarding another work that belongs to this genre: the Meteorologicorum libri quatuor published by Luke Wadding in the seventeenth-century edition of Duns Scotus, attributed to Duns Scotus until the twentieth century, and to Simon Tunsted since then. Pointing out yet another important contamination, we trace the intellectual paternity of Book IV of this text to Themon Judaeus. The author of the rest of the work remains unknown, but we can place its composition in the second half of the fourteenth century, in a Parisian setting influenced by Gregory of Rimini and John Buridan.
This literature is important both for our efforts of reconstructing the connections between these Parisian masters and for our knowledge of their scientific production. Optical issues developed in the third book constitute the main point of focus of such works, but they also discuss many other natural philosophical topics of interest such as the celestial influences, the nature of the sublunary bodies, the nature of light, causation and motion. Specific to the fourteenth century is an epistemological discussion that introduces the book, with little grounding in Aristotle's text: is meteorol- ogy a science and if so, what is its object of study? While all authors mention the question of the object of meteorology within the wider framework of the question of the object of scientific knowledge, Pseudo-Scotus is the only author encountered who has an extensive and thorough treatment of the topic. We therefore complement the critical note with a commentary of question 1 of Pseudo-Scotus, "Utrum de impressionibus meteorologicis sit scientia." The presentation of this discussion aims to contribute to our knowledge of the reception of English nominalism in Paris.
I. Critical note. Pseudo-Scotus and Themon Judaeus 1. It is known that the series of quaestiones on Aristotle's Meteorologica published by Luke Wadding (1588-1657) in the seventeenth-century Franciscan edition of Duns Scotus is not the work of Duns Scotus, in spite of the qualification of the text as "secundum Scotum" in some of the manuscripts. 3 Suspicions over the paternity of the text were raised by Wadding himself in a "Censura" that serves as a preface to the text. Wadding chose to include this text in his edition based on the testimony of John Pits (Johannes Pitseus, 1550-1616), who attributed to Duns Scotus a book on the Meteorologica ("librum unum") in his literary history of England. 4 While unwilling to treat the work as spurious ("licet Scoti esse non dissidam"), Wadding noted three elements that call into question the authenticity of the work: (1) Pits' mention of a "librum unum" could mean that Scotus had written only on the first book of the Meteorologica, whereas the text treats all four books; (2) the text names Saint Thomas "beatus", but Scotus died in 1308, long before the canonization of Saint Thomas in 1323; (3) the text also cites Thomas Bradwardine's Tractatus de proportionibus of 1328.
Wadding tried to offer ways of mitigating these elements: Pits could have meant a single volume, and not Book I of the Meteorologica; "beatus" would be a simple sign of respect in use before the canonization of Thomas; and the information on Bradwardine's life and works could be wrong.
If, however, one would hold the work to be spurious, Wadding proposed the name of Simon Tunsted (d. 1369), a Minor friar of Norwich who taught in Oxford, who is reported by the same source, John Pits, to have written a treatise on the Meteorologica, and who appears to have lived at the right time. We don't know much about Tunsted, and the rest of the Franciscan historians who mention him only repeat Pits's conclusions. There was little basis for Wadding's conjecture.
The text published by Wadding is a well-developed commentary in the form of quaestiones on all the four books and its content is manifestly close to that of analogous works from the second half of the fourteenth century. Whoever the author may be, Wadding noted the value and importance of the work: "Tractatus porro doctus est, curiosus et perutilis, neque ullum vidi in hoc genere ab antiquis potiori, aut ampliori studio exaratum."
In spite of Wadding's clear warnings, the text was attributed to Duns Scotus until the twentieth century. It made its career in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Scotism, when it was used as the basis for Franciscan courses on meteorology. 5 Meteorologica in Paris sometime in the 1340s. 8 Suter noted that a big part of the questions asked are "entirely the same." This is hardly surprising; the similarity in the titles of the questions holds not only for the relationship between Oresme and Pseudo-Scotus, but also for the entire literature on the Meteorologica produced in fourteenth-century Paris.
3. Pierre Duhem has drawn attention to the importance of the meteorological literature of the fourteenth century for the development of medieval physics in several of his works. He was also the first scholar to take Wadding's warnings seriously and treat Pseudo-Scotus as apocryphal in a note from 1905.
9 But, surprisingly, Duhem welcomed Wadding's conjecture regarding the attribution of the work to Simon Tunsted. He also noted the similarity between this text and the Parisian production of Nicole Oresme and Themon Judaeus, an author he had uncovered. 10 viation of an abbreviation. Duhem therefore positioned Pseudo-Scotus as an intermediary between Themon and Oresme.
Without giving much evidence, Duhem repeated in a second article from 1910 that Themon's questions are the "prototype" for Pseudo-Scotus, Oresme and Buridan.
11 From our reading of both texts, Duhem's assessment that Pseudo-Scotus had abbreviated Themon is at best an exaggeration (at least in what concerns the first three books, as we will show below).
4. Aleksander Birkenmajer has rectified Duhem's view in a study from 1921. Birkenmajer showed that a great deal of the material from Oresme's Book III is also present in Themon Judaeus's meteorology. 12 He offered a thorough analysis of the relationship between Oresme, Albert of Saxony, Pseudo-Scotus and Themon based on a comparison of Book III of each work. Birkenmajer's material suggests that we are dealing with deeply entangled but still different works. Based on internal evidence that emerged from his analysis of Book III, Birkenmajer managed to establish a chronology of the works: Oresme would come first (before 1348, when he started his theological studies), Buridan, Albert of Saxony and Pseudo-Scotus would be intermediary works (1350s), and Themon would come last (late 1350s). 13 A future and more thorough textual confrontation of all four books should further test the order proposed by Birkenmajer. In the meantime, there is no reason not to accept it. Regarding the relationship between Albert and Pseudo-Scotus, Birkenmajer maintains that one of them had access to the other and that both had access to Oresme's commentary. In any case, we can retain that these works were taught very close to each other. 14 He offered a comparison between the titles of the questions of Oresme and Pseudo-Scotus and concluded that they are different works (infirming Duhem). Concerning the chronology, Thorndike followed Birkenmajer, saying that "it might seem probable that the pseudo-Scotus would antecede the Questions of Themon". (In spite of this, Henri HuggonardRoche's more recent study on Themon still followed Duhem and placed Pseudo-Scotus as posterior to both Themon and Oresme.) 15 Regarding the manuscripts of Pseudo-Scotus, Thorndike reports that five of the seven Oxford manuscripts attribute only the first three books on the Meteorologica to Duns Scotus; one manuscript of the five (ms. 35, Oriol Coll., Oxford) attributes the first three books to a "Scotus Junior" ("secundum Scotum Juniorem"-this could also refer to a production of the early career of Scotus); the oldest of the five manuscripts (ms. 80, Magdalen Coll., Oxford) attributes the first three books to a Scotulus ("secundum Scotulum") and the fourth book to either an anonymous author or to the same Scotulus ("Anonymi an eiusdem Scotuli"). 16 All these nicknames suggest that we are dealing either with a Scotsman or with an early follower of Duns Scotus.
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Birkenmajer added yet another manuscript of Pseudo-Scotus, the only one to be found 8. Since Duhem's work on Themon, there has been an important evolution in our knowledge concerning this author: two astronomical disputations by him have been recovered in the Amplonian collection at Erfurt (mss. F. 313 and F 380, under Thimon Erfurtensis). They were signalled, although without a description, by Thorndike, in 1934, and Hugonnard-Roche edited one of them on the motion of the moon. 25 Duhem had lost track of Themon after the latter left Paris with a mission for Pope Innocent VI in 1359. We now know that he ended up in Erfurt in 1350 and that he held these disputations "apud Schotos," that is, at the Benedictine "Schottenkloster" of that city (the Abbey of Saint Jacob, founded by Irish and Scottish missionaries). 26 Not only that, but he became rector of this school. Could this have favoured the confusion in the manuscripts between Scotus/Scotulus (Pseduo-Scotus) and Themon? Themon reappears again at the Sorbonne, with a career in the Faculty of Arts; his trace is lost in 1371. 27 Themon's meteorology appears to be addressed to a Parisian audience, given his geographical references. Hugonnard-Roche dates it after his return from Erfurt, thus with 1350 as terminus post quem. 28 Birkenmajer dates the work after 1370 (posterior to Pseudo-Scotus, dated by him after 1355). The separation between the two works, that covering Books I-III and that covering Book IV, is confirmed by Thorndike's report on the Oxford manuscripts. According to Thorndike, in ms. 93, Balliol Coll., the fourth book comes first (96ra-107ra), before Books I-III (108ra-148va), so that the ending of Book III "Expliciunt questiones super tres libros 27 metheororum secundum Scotum doctorem subtilem" only applies to the first work (Books I-III). 30 Ms. 80, Magdalen Coll. also separates the two texts, but conjectures that Book IV could be by the same Scotulus.
II. Doctrinal commentary.

Utrum de meteorologicis sit scientia
As Thorndike and Kibre have noticed, any collection of questions on Meteorologica is susceptible of beginning with the question "Utrum de impressionibus meteoricis sit scientia (tanquam de subjecto)". 31 Buridan, Oresme, Themon, Albert of Saxony, and Pseudo-Scotus make no exception. This kind of question sprung from thirteenth-century discussions on the scientific character of theology and is common as an introduction to a particular science. 32 The material covers the scope of meteorology, its subject matter as distinct from that of other natural philosophical disciplines, and its status as an Aristotelian demonstrative scientia. The exposition usually concludes with remarks on the probable character of meteorology, owing to the instability of meteorological bodies: meteorology is a science that, although it strives for the ideal of an Aristotelian demonstrative science, can only attain it partially.
Fourteenth-century texts usually mention in this context the much-debated issue of the object of scientific knowledge developed on both sides of the English Channel from the 1320s onwards. The main rival epistemological theories concerning the object of science are known: is the object the conclusion of a syllogism, is it the thing in itself, or is it the total significate of the conclusive proposition (significabile complexe)? In spite of having received considerable attention from scholars, there is still much ground to be covered in this dossier. remains little known and there are many unanswered questions concerning the paternity of particular arguments and their circulation from one master to another. Much of the results in tracing filiations remain provisional, waiting for advancements from textual criticism and history. With this caveat noted, the presentation of Pseudo-Scotus's treatment of the object of meteorology will allow us to shed more light on what we believe to be the common opinion held in Paris in the second half of the century, a position developed as a result of the rejection of Gregory of Rimini's notion of the adequate significate of a proposition (significabile complexe). The Parisian masters, from Buridan to Pseudo-Scotus, Themon and up to Marsilius of Inghen, maintain the following view: the conclusion of the demonstration is the immediate object of scientific knowledge, the terms of the conclusion are the remote object, and the things signified by those terms are the final, but most important, object. I take this opinion to be a development of Ockham, mediated by Buridan. Thus Pseudo-Scotus, who presents, often in an abbreviated form, the main of the arguments of this debate, is a valuable witness of the development of Parisian nominalism.
Meteorology as an Aristotelian scientia
The answer to the literal question, "is there a [proper, Aristotelian] science of the meteors," is far from mysterious and all authors will arrive at a positive conclusion. The question had its tradition in the Paris curriculum before the import of the views on the object of scientific knowledge from Oxford. Siger of Brabant's discussion from the thirteenth century ("utrum de impressionibus possit esse scientia") offers a summary of the material inherited by fourteenth-century authors. Siger argued from a strictly Aristotelian perspective: the subject of meteorology is universal, incorruptible, real and not artificial. Most importantly, meteors have properties (passiones), and something that has properties can be scientifically investigated by deriving those properties from known principles. Therefore a science of meteorological phenomena is possible, This is one side of the answer that will endure through the fourteenth-century literature: meteorology is an Aristotelian demonstrative science as established in the Posterior Analytics. It does not come without arguing. A first series of contra arguments, seeking to show the epistemological weakness of meteorology, revolve around probability and certitude.
(1) It is claimed that one can only arrive at insecure notions or at mere opinions regarding the meteors ("notitia cum formidine ad oppositum" is the technical term, a notion with fear that the opposite may also be true). 35 The limits of meteorology as a demonstrative science from a priori principles are usually admitted here. Pseudo-Scotus will concede that about certain meteors, such as the comets and the Milky Way, we can only have opinions, and not scientia. But, he adds, there are only a very limited number of such phenomena; about most meteors "we have true notions"-although we can't attain in natural science the kind of certitude we can have in mathematics or optics (one can invoke for support here a famous passage from Aristotle, Met. 35 Idem, p. 3a: "Arguitur quod non, quia de impressionibus solum habetur notitia cum formidine ad oppositum; ergo, etc." See also Themon, In I Meteor., q. 1 (ed. 1522), p. 87a: "Queritur primo utrum de impressionibus meteorologicis sit scientia. Et arguitur primo quod non, quia de omnibus impressionibus est solum vaticinium coniectura et divinatio vel opinio: ergo de illibus non est scientia. Consequentia patet, quia scientia est habitus certus omnibus demonstrate sine formidine." 14-16). 36 Themon is even more pessimistic on this point, considering that Aristotle's Meteorologica books are an aggregate of a few proper demonstrations amidst many opinions and conjectures. 37 (2) Interestingly though, the probabilism attested by the previous argument is counter-balanced by another contra argument. Meteorology depends heavily on empirical observations; the experience of the senses that testify of meteorological phenomena is far more secure than any scientific notion we can have, given the infirmity of our intellect in our current state. The generally shared principle invoked is experientia sensus est notita dignior quam scientia. But Aristotelian science does not consist solely of pure observations. Pseudo-Scotus answers that empiricism, on its own, does not yield an Aristotelian science, which consists instead in the interpretation of the experiences gathered. We are to add a "scientific notion" to the experience of the senses, by searching for the proper causes of those experiences, as Aristotle teaches. 38 Another series of contra arguments is drawn from the specific character of the material that meteorology deals with. (3) The ephemeral status of the meteors, already encountered in Siger, suggests that there can be no knowledge of things that are not present when the knowledge is acquired-e.g., lightning, thunder, or the rainbow. About these, Pseudo-Scotus holds that we will have a "provisional science" (scientia conditionalis) that remains to be verified, and not a proper affirmative demonstrative science. 39 classical argument is taken from the inordinate character of meteorological phenomena, to which Pseudo-Scotus will devote a long separate question: meteors appear to arise from violent motions, they are produced against nature and they are impossible to predict. 40 Buridan and Themon give a variation of this argument: meteorological phenomena happen a casu vel a fortuna, whereas science is about necessary phenomena (scientia est de necessariis).
41 Pseudo-Scotus insists on the causal order of production, which is necessary for any science looking for the causes of phenomena: if the order is changed, the science acquired on the basis of the old order of phenomena will be falsified (mutato ordine, mutabitur, sive falsificatur scientia). The answer returns to the mixed character of meteorology: some meteors are generated violently (e.g., thunder strike is not part of the natural inclination of fire), while some are generated naturally (rain drops arise because of gravity, a natural inclination of water). But all meteors, even the violently generated ones, are part of the general order of creation, just like any other body of the universe, even though their motions are more difficult to discern than the motion of celestial bodies. There is less order in the meteors, but less order does not mean no order at all.
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The nominalist challenge To this predictable set of arguments, Pseudo-Scotus adds a new problematic drawn from the Ockhamist tradition. The basis for considering meteorology an Aristotelian demonstrative science being laid, we are now faced with epistemological issues that apply to all sciences. It is said by others, reports Pseudo-Scotus, that the meteors cannot make the object of The argument is meant to show that the distinction between the intellectual acts of scientific knowledge, faith and opinion needs a distinction between their objects. The claim is not that the singular thing is not the object of science, faith and opinion, taken separately, but that something more besides the singular thing of the world must be posited in order to distinguish these intellectual acts.
We are now inside the vaster nominalist problematic on what is the proper object attained by scientific knowledge. The different theories on this matter are usually mentioned at this point in the corresponding texts of the other Parisian masters mentioned in this essay, but Pseudo-Scotus's treatment is by far the most extended and thorough. He reports on the main arguments developed before him, discusses Gregory's theory of a significabile complexe as the object of science, and lays down his own view. Buridan, for instance, does not mention the theory of the significabile complexe in this place, while his critique of Gregory on this point is well known from other places in his corpus. 45 Buridan goes straight to the solution, without arguing: that there are three objects of science, the demonstrated conclusion, the terms that compose the conclusive sentence and the things signified by the terms. 46 Themon, for his part, argues briefly that just as the sensible things are the ultimate object of sensation, so the things outside of the mind are the ultimate object of scientific knowledge, on the basis of the principle sicut in sensu, ita et in intellectu. discussion has been brought to scholarly attention by Hubert Élie's pioneering study on Gregory's notion of the complexe significabile (1936) . 48 Our historical representation of it has suffered a number of revisions since then, the most important of which is the attribution of the theory to Adam Wodeham rather than Gregory, by Gedeon Gál (1977). 49 As far as historians of medieval logic are concerned, the problem of the object of scientific knowledge is a question of the bearer of truth and falsity (is it the proposition which carries that function, is it the res extra, or is it the total significate of the proposition, the significabile complexe?). 50 The discussion is initially developed in the theological literature over the Sentences, where it was important to determine the differences between the subject of science and that of faith, in order to clarify the distinction between the two disciplines ("Utrum theologia sit scientia una de Deo tamquam de subjecto"). , 1985) , presents the aftermath in the sixteenth century; texts belonging to this discussion are gathered in D. Perler, Satztheorien: Texte zur Sprachphilosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie im 14. Jahrhundert (Darmstadt : Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990); J. Biard, "Les controverses sur l'objet du savoir," op. cit., offers a good summary. 50 According to E.J. Ashworth, "Theorie of the Propositions: Some Early Sixteenth Century Discussions," op. cit., there is a cluster of three questions at stake: the question over the object of scientific knowledge, the question over the bearer of truth and falsity, and the question over what is the significate of a proposition. One answer should satisfy all three. 51 There are more precise theological roots of the discussion, some of which are discussed by Nuchelmans, Theories of the proposition, 177-194 (on theological arguments leading up to Ockham and Holkot's complexum But soon enough, the epistemological question invades all disciplines: logic, physics, metaphysics, and, as we have seen, even meteorology. In doing so, it carries along with it the cognitive discussion over the relationship between the intellectual act of knowing, the object of knowledge and the real objects of the world specific to fourteenth century nominalism, and measures it against the requirements of an Aristotelian demonstrative science codified by the Posterior Analytics. Thus an answer to this question aims at securing, ultimately, the inherited notion of scientia: how can we attain a science of necessary and unchanging things by grasping only a limited number of particular things-or not even those, but merely their signs?
52 Briefly put, in terms of a long durational historiography, the challenge facing the Parisians was how to maintain the Aristotelian understanding of science after the Ockhamist linguistic turn.
The beginnings of this discussion are situated in late 1320s-early 1330s Oxford, in the debates surrounding Ockham's epistemology. The question is still "what is the subject of this science (tanquam de subjecto)?" The thirteenth-century vocabulary distinguished between the esse subjectivum of the res in itself and the esse objectivum of the res in/as an object of the mind. The subject of a science is the material it deals with (e.g., the mobile body, the imperfect mixtures, the meteors; for the Ockhamist, this will be the term that has the function of grammatical subject in the sentence that concludes the demonstration). The object of a science is that in which the intellectual act of knowing terminates, in the sense in which we speak of objects of the senses as that which the senses touch. 53 Although there is a fluctuation of the terms subjectum and objectum scientiae in the literature and they are often used indiscriminately, it is the object that we are looking in this questions, that which terminates the act of knowing (illud quod scitur). For Ockham, the immediate object of science is the propositional content at which it arrives, that is, the conclusions of the scientific demonstrations. A conclusion is a proposition, called a complexum or complexum mentale; it is complex because it is composed of simple terms; it is also mental because it is independent of its vocal utterance. 54 Against this Ockhamist position, his critic Walter Chatton raised an important and far-reaching objection: knowledge and faith had better attain the things in themselves, not some mental construct; faith in God should aim at God, not at a proposition. Chatton thus held, against Ockham, that both the act of knowing and the act of assenting have the things outside of the mind as their object, and not the "complex signification of the thing outside of the mind." Chatton's critique of Ockham , 1985) , vol. IV, 9: "Nam obiectum scientiae est tota propositio nota, subiectum est pars illius propositionis, scilicet terminus subiectus. Sicut scientiae qua scio quod omnis homo est susceptibilis disciplinae, obiectum est tota propositio, sed subiectum est iste terminus 'homo'." It would be tedious to send the reader to the numerous commentators of this view; for Ockham's conception of science, I rely mostly on R. Guelluy 56 Although Adam is now believed to have been the initiator of the theory, I will insist on Gregory, who was the primary source for the Parisian discussion and was followed closely by Pseudo-Scotus. The view put forward by Adam and Gregory is that the signification of a proposition is distinct from both the material sentence (i.e., from the terms that compose it) and from the things signified by the sentence. It is the significatum totale or adaequatum of the sentence that makes the object of scientific knowledge. 57 Assent cannot be given to the proposition alone, argued Gregory, against Ockham: it can only be given to the fact that the proposition is in agreement with the signified things as they are in the world. The total and adequate signification of the proposition "Deus est" is "Deum esse," the fact that God is. These total and adequate significations are true or false even if there is no sentence uttered to signify them (Deum esse does not cease to be true once the sentence has been said), and so they are called significabiles or enuntiabiles; they are also called complex, for they require a sentence in order to be signified, a complexum of terms. In simple speech, the technical term significabile complexe stands for the significate of a proposition. 58 Pseudo-Scotus inherits thus from this discussion three viae: according to one via, the subject of science is the known conclusion (this is labelled as the Ockhamist position by Gregory; but it is rather the Ockhamist position as critiqued by Chatton, or Holkot's position); 59 another via is that of the significabile complexe (Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini); and a third via is that of the things signified through the terms of the known conclusions (Chatton's view).
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This is the status questionis on which an author was supposed to give his opinion. After exposing the arguments, mainly based on Gregory, Pseudo-Scotus arrives at what he takes to be a reconciliatory position-but one that, as we will see, is actually a development of the second view.Pseudo-Scotus seems to be very much aware of Gregory of Rimini's arguments: he uses his arguments when exposing the problem, but he argues nevertheless against Gregory's position, in the same camp with Buridan. Chronologically, Pseudo-Scotus should have had direct access to both these authors, but it is safer to assume that he was drawing from a common pool of known arguments. The fact that Pseudo-Scotus reports what appears to be an abbreviation of Gregory's arguments testifies to the deep influence that Gregory had in the Parisian milieu. 58 For the prehistory of these terms, see P. Bermon 
Refutation of the "Ockhamist" position
Whether conclusions are the object of scientific knowledge or not, it is argued for as follows.
(1) The first via argues that truth and falsity can only be applied to propositions, not to things in themselves. Things in themselves cannot be qualified as true or false; on the contrary, a demonstrative scientific conclusion can only be derived from true propositions. If science is about true things, on the basis of the principle nihil scitur nisi verum, then only propositions can be true.
The refutation provided attacks on the principle nihil scitur nisi verum: Pseudo-Scotus maintains that one can know things without qualifying them as true or false. 61 Gregory had made the same point on behalf of Ockham (via Adam, via Chatton).
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(2) A second argument claims directly that a general science of singular things is impossible. Science works with universal notions; the object of universal science can be a) a universal conclusion, q.e.d., b) a universal, but they do not exist, or c) the singular thing signified by the conclusion. Singular things however cannot make the object of universal notions: there is no reason to consider this particular triangle as the object of the universal notion of 'triangle' rather than that particular triangle. Once again, Pseudo-Scotus is drawing on Gregory. 63 Unlike Gregory though, who can oppose to this ar- 63 Pseudo-Scotus, In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 2, p. 4a: "Secundo, quia objectum scientiae universale vel est ipsa conclusio universalis, et habetur intentum; vel est ipsa res signata per terminos istius conclusionis, et tunc vel res universalis, et hoc non, cum nulla talis sit; vel res singularis, et hoc non, quia qua ratione una res singularis est objectum istius notitiae, eadem ratione alia, et per consequens nulla res est objectum istius." Gregory, In 1 Sent., prol., q. 1, a. 1, p. 2: "Secundo, obiectum scientiae demonstrationis universalis est conclusio illius demonstrationis, igitur et cuiuslibet scientiae gument the theory of the significabile complexe, Pseudo-Scotus replies with a traditional view: the object of universal conclusions are indeed all singular things to which that conclusion applies, singular things of which the universal notion yields a confused concept. The universal concept of 'homo' is caused by a limited number of singular human, and yet through it we have a confused concept of all human beings in the world.
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(3) A third argument for the Ockhamist position is drawn from the knowledge of figments. The object of a known conclusion such as "The hircocervus is not a chimera" cannot be the thing outside of the mind signified by it, because it does not exist; therefore it has to be the proposition itself. The reification of imaginary objects such as chimeras is a position developed initially in Oxford but also taught in Paris, by Marsilius of Inghen for instance. According to this view, the complex concept of a hircocervus is not simply the juxtaposition of the simpler concept of a half-goat with the simpler concept of a half-stag, but something distinct from the two. This is not the view that Pseudo-Scotus follows: he opts for the alternative opinion, associated with Buridan and Albert of Saxony, according to which the object of a chimera is nothing more than the sum of the objects of its components. Only existing objects signify: there is no void reference. 65 per demonstrationem acquisitae obiectum est conclusio demonstrationis illius. Assumptum probatur, quia vel ipsa conclusio universalis est obiectum illius scientiae, et habetur propositum, vel res extra animam. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia nec res universalis, cum nulla sit huiusmodi, nec res singularis, quia non potius una quam alia significata per subiectum conclusionis [est obiectum]."
64 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 6, p. 6a: "Dico quod objectum conclusionis universalis est quaelibet res singularis significata per objectum istius conclusionis, quia quaelibet talis apprehenditur per conclusionem universalem, saltem conceptu confuso. 
Another argument is drawn from the principle that assent necessarily follows a known true notion. This can lead an Ockhamist to think that the object of a known scientific notion and the object of assent are one and the same (idem est id quod scimus et id cui assentimus). If id quod scimus=id cui assentimus, we fall back on the previously mentioned case that propositions are the object of both, because only propositions can be true, and we assent to what is true. An objector needs therefore to deny the identification between the object of knowledge and the object of assent: we assent to propositions, but we know things.
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Two further arguments are laid down that attack the cognitive mechanism of a science of conclusions, both of them drawn from Gregory. (5) If the object of science were the conclusion, it would follow that one has a reflexive act accompanying one's act of knowing every time one knows something. However, such a reflexive act applied to what we know is very rare, and most of our scientific knowledge does not terminate in a reflection over what we have come to know, but in the things signified.
67 (6) Admitting that the conclusive sentence is the object of knowledge and is apprehended by the intellect, one asks: is this apprehension complex or simple (incomplex)? Scientific knowledge cannot be obtained solely from simple apprehensions of singulars, for science does not satisfy itself with pure empiricism: scientific knowledge joins evident principles or predetermined knowledge with simple apprehensions. We cannot be dealing with complex apprehensions either. A complex apprehension grasps a proposi-
The Rise of British Logic (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1983), 265-283, for the Oxford discussion.
66 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 6, p. 6b: "Negatur, quia illud scimus tanquam objectum scientiae, quod significatur per partes illius cui assentimus."
67 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 3, p. 4b: "Contra istam opinionem opponitur, quia si conclusio esset objectum scientiae habitae per conclusionem, sequeretur quod quilibet actu sciens haberet actu cognoscendi conclusionem. Consequens falsum, quia nunquam, vel raro habemus actum reflexum super nostram cognitionem, quamvis saepe cognoscamus." Cf. Gregory, In 1 Sent. prol. q. 1, a. 1, p. 4: "Nam plerumque, immo quasi semper contingit quod demonstrans, quamvis formet conclusionem, non tamen actu reflectitur super illam apprehendendo ipsam, sed directe figit suum aspectum in id, quod ipsa significat." tion together with its relationship to the signified things, and judges their conformity to one another. That means that the complex apprehension intrinsically bears a truth value (apprehensio judiciaria is Gregory's term). That would automatically make the conclusion true, which is more than we want: we know in fact many conclusions without knowing their conformity with things, such as the conclusions of geometrical demonstrations.
68
The significabile complexe and the eternal truths
The second way reported by Pseudo-Scotus argues that the object of the proposition "Man is able to laugh" (Homo est risibilis) is neither man, nor laughter, but the state of affairs of "man being able to laugh" (Hominem esse risibilem). This is Gregory's position. The main argument for the significabile complexe relies on the already encountered analogy between sensorial knowledge and scientific knowledge: when I feel hot fire, through this experience I know not only fire and not only hotness, but I know the fact that fire is hot (ignem esse calidum). 69 The knowledge of the centre of the circle to which 68 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 3, p. 4b: "Secundo, si conclusio esset objectum, tunc conclusio apprehenderetur ab intellectu, et tunc quaeratur, utrum apprehensione incomplexa, vel complexa? non incomplexa, quia talis non est scientia, cum sit acquiribile ab intelletu de quocumque complexo, vel incomplexo. Modo scientia non acquiritur sine evidentia alicujus principii, vel experientiae, praedeterminante intellectum. Non complexa, quia maxime esset talis conclusio vera: sed illud est falsum, quia multoties scimus, et cognoscimus per conclusiones, cum non consideramus de veritate, vel de falsitate earum." Gregory, In 1 Sent., prol. q. 1, pp. 4-5, renders Pseudo-Scotus's last claim intelligible: "Si dicatur quod conclusio apprehenditur apprehensione iudiciaria et enuntiativa, hoc erit, ut videtur, apprehensio, qua cognoscitur ipsa conclusio esse conformis rei seu esse vera, nam nulla alia videtur esse ad propositum; sed certum est quod non quilibet demonstrans habet talem notitiam de sua conclusione. Unde nec geometra demonstrans latera trianguli descripti secundum doctrinam primae conclusionis Primi Euclidis esse aequalia considerat vel apprehendit quod conclusio, quia enuntiat illa esse aequalia, est vera." See also the same argument made by Marsilius of Inghen, In 1 Sent. q. 2, a. 3, in Quaestiones super quattuor libros "Sententiarum," ed. M. S. Noya (Leiden: Brill, 2000), vol. I, 79.
69 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 4, p. 5a: "Alia via est, quod objectum scientiae est significabile complexe, per conclusionem scitam, sicut objectum istius, Homo est risibilis, est, hominem esse risibilem, quod probatur, quia objec-the geometer arrives is the same knowledge that a quarryman has; and yet this quarryman does not have knowledge neither of the geometrical proposition that signifies the centre of the circle, nor of the circle in itself: he only knows the situation of the centre of the circle.
Against the significabile complexe, the arguments mobilise the ontological question of whether it is something distinct from the signified thing or not. An Aristotelian principle is invoked in order to certify that "to be the same" (esse ipsum) and "the same" (ipsum) are identical (Metaph. 1017a 27-30 and 1029b 13-15): Deum esse=Deus. 70 If indeed the complex signifiable were something distinct from God, it would follow that it is a co-eternal thing, not created by God and therefore independent from God and not submitted to His will and power. God cannot destroy the signifiable "Deum esse," for it would destroy himself.
71
This argument from the co-eternal and independent truths became the main tool used by the Parisians against Gregory. Marsilius of Inghen has a more elaborate version of it, which can explain its force. The question Marsilius asks is: "utrum 'Deus esse' est aliquid vel pure nihil." If it is nothing, "as master Gregory says," there can be no science of things, and the object of science would be a pure non-being, which tum notitiae habitae per experientiam est tale significabile complexe; igitur est cujuslibet alterius notitiae. Consequentia tenet, quia ubique videtur judicium idem esse. Et antecedens patet, quia si sentiam ignem esse calidum, per istam experientiam non solum cognosco ignem, nec solum caliditatem, sed cognosco ignem esse calidum."
70 In 1 Meteor. q. 1, 4, p. 5a: "Contra istam viam arguitur, primo, quia vel tale significabile complexe est res distincta a re significata, vel non. Si sic, contra, primo per Aristotelem 5. Metaphysic. ubi dicit quod in dictis secundum se, idem est esse ipsum, et ipsum, sicut idem est esse Deum, et Deus." Cf. Marsilius, In 1 Sent., q. 2, ed. Noya, pp. 81-82: "Et ergo tenendo suppositionem est prima propositio haec contra hanc opinionem: 'Deum esse est Deus.' Probatur primo sic auctoriate Philosophi 7 Metaphysicae dicentis: 'In dictis secundum se est idem ipsum et esse ipsum.' Sed manifestum est quod de Deo dicitur esse secundum se; igitur esse Deum est Deus vel Deum esse est Deus."
71 In 1 Meteor. q. 1, 4, p. 5a: "Secundo, quod si esset tale distinctum, sequeretur quod est aliquod ens coaeternum cum Deo, quod Deus, nec posset augmentare, nec diminuere, nec annullare, dato quod Deus esset infiniti vigoris, sicut concedimus ipsum esse." sounds upsetting to the scientist. If the proposition "Deum esse" is something though, distinct from God, it follows that we must concede two original principles (duo prima), which sounds upsetting to both philosophers and Catholics. To explain this last consequence: the fact that God is the first incomplex thing needs no comment; in addition, there seems to be an order between the signifiables too, for "man having a rational soul" seems to be prior to "man being able to be educated," such that one can be said to be the cause, and the other, the effect; we are now in a causal chain of significabilia: we must look for the first cause or an original singnificabile, since there can be no infinite causal regress; it cannot be God, for God is simple; it cannot be dependent on God (non sit a Deo), for then God could destroy the signifiable "Deum esse" and still be, i.e. it would still conserve its significance "God is" (a paradoxical formulation of the argument made by Pseudo-Scotus that, if the signifiables were independent of God, than God could not destroy "Deum esse"); the original signifiable must therefore be an original complex independent thing. Thus we arrive again at the upsetting conclusion of having two original principles: "Deum esse" is a truth independent from God and as equally necessary as God.
72
The idea that co-eternal truth exists alongside God is circulated in Paris on lists of articles condemned under the title "quod multae fuerunt veritates ab aeterno quod non erant Deus." This condemned article was signalled by Hubert Élie as part of a presupposed theological condemnation of 1340, not to be found.
73 Surprisingly, Alain de Libera has retraced the article back to the Parisian condemnation of January 1241 initiated by William of Auvergne against the "other" nominalists, the twelfth-century logicians .
74 It is a rare and interesting connection between the two currents. It is clear that this thesis preoccupied logicians at least since Philip the 72 But it is quite an unfair case to make. Marsilius's question, "utrum 'Deum esse' est aliquid vel pure nihil," intentionally ignores Gregory's discussion of the three senses of being for which he is best remembered. Gregory had laid down this theory of the three senses of being precisely as a pre-emptive defence against this kind of ontologization of the significabile complexe. Aliquid, res or ens, as synonymous terms, are said in three ways according to Gregory: "in a first sense, very generally (communissime), any signifiable, complex or incomplex, true or false, is said to be [or: is called] a thing or something"; "in a second sense, these terms are used for any signifiable, complex or even incomplex, but true, that is, by means of a true expression"; "in a third sense, these terms are understood as signifying an essence or an existing entity." 77 The first sense of "something" is a general sense indifferent both truth/falsity and to existence; the second sense is indifferent only to existence, not to truth or falsity; and 75 the third sense is indifferent to neither: it must be both true and existent. The purpose of Gregory's distinction is to separate the third sense of "something," that of an existent being in the world, from the other two senses of "something," that are said without regard to whether they exist or not. The total significate of the proposition can be said to be something (aliquid, res or ens) only in the first and second sense, but not in the third sense: it is not an existent being in the world. In Gregory's terms, it is a non-existent being, but is not "nothing". 78 Granted, this can give way to paradoxical readings, and Marsilius famously complains about the non-intelligibility of something that is not a substance, nor an accident, nor nothing. 79 Nevertheless, Gregory's intention to exclude a reading of the signifiables as existing entities in the outside world is clear. Gregory's critics, by making the argument that the signifiables co-exist alongside God, understand them in the third sense: they co-exist in the same sense in which God exists, something that Gregory denies explicitly.
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78 Idem, p. 9: "[...] Sed ulteriorem consequentiam nego, qua dicitur "igitur scientia nullum habet obiectum", nam habet obiectum, quod non est ens." 79 Marsilius, In 1 Sent., q. 2; ed. Noya, p. 81: "Hic modus de significabilibus complexis distinctus a rebus incomplexis vel est adeo subtilis quod imaginationem communium excedit et praesertim meam, vel fortassis est ex ignorantia logicae introductus." To grasp the distinction that Gregory makes between the third sense of being and the first two, Alain de Libera has proposed to think of it in terms of a distinction between "being eternally," which the signifiables are not, in spite of the critique mounted against them, and "being true eternally", which the signifiables are, as contingent truths dependent upon God's understanding (La référence vide, pp. 219-221; see also Gregory in In 1 Sent., d. 38, q. 2, ed. Trapp- Marcolino, vol. 3, 304) . 80 In this sense, Pascale Bermon argues, against Élie and Nuchelman's reading, that, because the signfiables are not an existing entity, Gregory is not a "conceptual realist," a forerunner of the twentieth-century ontology of the object (L'assentiment et son objet, pp. 181-184); she rightfully points out that in denying an 'existing entity' to the significabile complexe, Gregory acts as a perfect nominalist. Alain de Libera reexamines the connections between Gregory The thesis secures access to the external thing, mediated by the terms of the proposition and further mediated by the proposition itself. Marsilius offers, again, a development of the argument-as a refutation of Gregory, correctly, and not as a "synthesis" of the three views. He speaks of the proximate object (the proposition), the remote object (the terms as signs) and the most remote or ultimate object, the things in themselves:
Tertio suppono quod obiectum assensus immediatum est propositio; remotum, eius termini inquantum signa sunt rerum; et remotissimum et ultimatum et etiam maxime intentum est res incomplexa significata per terminos, saltem in affirmativis de inesse et de praesenti. 83 For instance, Marsilius explains, the immediate object of the knowledge and assent to the proposition "God is" is the proposition itself; the middle-way object (remotum) is the term "God" as a sign for the First Being; the last object (remotissimum) is the First Being itself.
The thesis arises in Paris therefore as a refutation of Gregory, which wanted to refute Ockham, so we have the impression of sort of a linear development. This is not the case. The thesis of the threefold object of science is actually a return to Ockham, in a circular development. Marsilius states: "this 82 In 1 Meteor., q. 1, 5, p. 6a. 83 Marsilius, In 1 Sent., q. 2, a. 3, ed. Noya, p. 78. See also Quaestiones super libros Priorum analyticorum (Venice, 1516), lib. I, q. 1. The fist text speaks of the object of assent, while the second text speaks of the object of knowledge: they are the same for Marsilius. appears to be the opinion of many people and especially that of Ockham in the fourth question of his Prologue and it is the common opinion." 84 It is unclear to which passage Marsilius wants to refer his readers. Rather than the fourth question of Ockham's prologue, which deals with the derivation of properties from the prime subject, the ninth question, on "Utrum Deus sub propria ratione deitatis sit subiectum theologiae," seems a more appropriate reference (as the editor notes). Ockham's answer distinguishes between the subject as "that which supposits" (pro illo quod supponit) and the subject as that which is supposited (pro illo pro quo supponitur). God is the subject of theology, if by subject we understand the significate (illo pro quo supponitur), in an improper manner; but God is not the subject of theology, if by subject we understand the signifier (pro illo quod supponit), as we normally do. The term "God" acts as a sign, a concept that is directly connected to the thing outside of the mind, the First Being. 85 Ockham can avoid accusations of scepticism with reference to the idea that the conclusion is the object of science, of the kind that are raised in this debate, through his theory of personal supposition, which guarantees the connection between the term and the res extra. 86 Marsilius, writing a generation after Gregory, can fully appreciate this, and can present the thesis of the threefold object of science as derived from Ockham's theory of supposition.
A question of priority remains to be settled. The thesis of the threefold object of science has been associated with Marsilius of Inghen in the literature, and it is apparently through Marsilius that it has been transmitted to the nominales of the fifteenth century. 87 Marsilius lectured on the Sentences in Heidelberg in 1392-1394, but he started his theological studies sometime around 1366 in Paris and could have gathered material around that time. His dates are thus close to the presumed dates of Pseudo-Scotus (1350s). But it is unlikely that the latter knew of Marsilius's commentary, for he doesn't report any of the otherwise interesting argument he contributes to the discussion. More importantly, the thesis of the threefold object of science is in circulation at least since Buridan, who reported it in several places, including his Meteorology: (1) Buridan presents the threefold sense of the scibile-which is the basis for the threefold object of science thesis-in his An. Post. I, q. 2: the proposition is the scibile primum et immediatum, the terms of the proposition are a second sense of the scibile, and the signified things are a third sense. 88 (2) Buridan applies the threefold object the-sis in the first question of his commentary on the Physics I, saying that the demonstration does not consist in just the conclusion, but also in the terms that compose the conclusion together with their significate. 89 (3) His Meteorology then uses the thesis fully, in the same way as Pseudo-Scotus. 90 
Conclusion
We can now locate the valuable questions on meteorology published by Wadding with a little more precision in the Parisian intellectual setting of the second half of the fourteenth century. The Parisian discussion of the object of science suggests the following chronological sequence. As far as we know, Buridan is probably the initiator of the theory of the threefold object of science maintained by all Parisian masters associated with him whom we have discussed in this essay. 91 The fact that when Marsilius reports the threefold object thesis, he presents it as an Ockhamist position, suggests that the perception of Ockham's on the matter has evolved since Gregory's critique of the conclusion thesis (via Oxford). Initially, Ockham is read by someone like Gregory (indirectly, through Adam's report on Chatton's critique) as proposing that the object of science is the conclusion of a syllogism, with the skeptical danger that this prevented access to the res extra. : 654-673, shows that Buridan used the older theory of natural supposition to oppose Ockham's view that demonstrative propositions are to be considered as hypothetical ("Man is able to laugh" should be read as "if a man exists, it is able to laugh"). This is a side issue; Buridan seems to me to stay close to Ockham's understanding of personal supposition with his use of the threefold scibile as a mean to reach the objectivity of knowledge.
While arguing against Gregory's theory of the significabile complexe, Buridan and his intellectual circle, including Themon, Pseudo-Scotus and up to Marsilius, developed the theory of the threefold object of science. This theory is then read back into Ockham's theory of supposition, and rightfully so, at least by someone like Marsilius. It is worth thus noting that a consequence of the general rejection of Gregory's theory of the significabile complexe is a deeper appreciation of Ockham: Marsilius's threefold object thesis presents a truer Ockham than that of Gregory. By the sixteenth century, the discussion of the total significate of the proposition became a standard topic in commentaries on the Posterior Analytics, and the nominalist threefold object solution became the most common opinion.
92
The solution developed by the Parisian masters justifies the study of language as part of the study of nature. Marsilius asks: what would be the purpose of studying the terms, other than to grant epistemic access to their reference? 93 From the point of view of securing the Aristotelian demonstrative science, the threefold object thesis has the obvious advantage of granting access to both contingent things (the ultimate object) and to necessary propositions (the immediate object): we can say necessary truths about changing things. In forging this view, Parisian philosophers adapted to what was asked of them. In addition to condemning the significabile complexe, the Statute of the Parisian Faculty of Arts of 29 December 1340 asked from its scholars a realist opinion about science as being, ultimately, about things, not about signs:
92 See E.J. Ashworth, "Theories of the proposition," who investigates Thomas Bricot, Juan Celaya and Antonio Coronel. 93 Marsilius, In 1 Sent., q. 2, a. 3, ed. Noya, p. 79: "Quae enim esset cura homini de cognitione orationis vel terminorum, nisi eis mediantibus haberet cognitionem rerum incomplexarum per terminos significatarum?"
